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BARGAINING THE DIVISION OF LINK COSTS 
 








This paper presents a model of network formation with costly links. We 
endogenize the amount of cost born by each player involved in a bilateral link by 
considering that these shares result from bargaining. We analyze this feature in a 
context of coordination games. We show that, if the cost of the link is not too high, the 
complete network arises and players coordinate on the same action. If this cost is higher 
than the risk-dominance premium the efficient action is selected; instead, if it is lower, 
the risk-dominant action prevails. 
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 1 Introduction
There are social and economic situations in which the existence of some kind of connec-
tions between agents is necessary to interact. We can think for example on information
transmission: agents need some way of communication in order to be able to exchange
information. In many cases, the establishment and maintenance of these connections is
costly. We model a situation in which agents face a coordination problem when they
interact, this is, any two players who establish a link beneﬁt if they are coordinated in
the same action. The main feature of our model is how the agents, who form a link, share
the cost it involves. We propose that this division results from bargaining; in this sense,
we make the agents’ shares of the link cost endogenous.
The model consists in a two-stage game where, in the ﬁrst stage, each agent of the
population chooses a standard (e.g. PC vs. Macintosh) and the second stage deals with
the network formation, that is, given the choices on standards, each agent decides who
she wants to interact with (i.e. form links). The payoﬀs from the interaction between two
agents are represented by a 2x2 symmetric coordination game in which we identify the
actions with the chosen standards. This game is characterized by two pure strategy Nash
equilibria, one eﬃcient and the other risk-dominant. The formation of a link is costly and
we consider that the amount of cost born by each agent results from bargaining. Thus,
given the action proﬁle chosen in the ﬁrst stage, each pair of players enters in a bargaining
process in which either they agree on how to share the cost in order to form a link, or
they do not form a link. We propose the Nash bargaining solution to distribute the cost.
We show that any equilibrium of this game is characterized either by the emergence of
the complete network and the fact that all the agents choose the same standard or by the
empty network. Nevertheless, we ﬁnd that this game presents multiplicity of equilibria;
there are regions of the parameter space where two equilibrium states coexist: either
everybody choosing the eﬃcient action or everybody choosing the risk-dominant one. To
deal with this multiplicity we introduce a dynamic version of the model in which, from
any initial state, each period players receive revision opportunities with some positive
probability. We assume a myopic best-response adjustment to update strategies. We
2analyze the set of limit states of this process and ﬁnd that the initial multiplicity persists.
In order to address the issue of equilibrium selection we use stochastic stability techniques.
We obtain a treshold for the cost of the link which coincides with the risk-dominance
premium of the coordination game. If the cost of the link is lower than this treshold
we show that all the population coordinates on the (ineﬃcient) risk-dominant standard
in the (unique) stochastically stable state. If the cost of the link is higher, eﬃciency is
achieved, provided that the cost is not so high that no link can be (weakly) proﬁtable for
both players involved.
The study of networks has been increasingly considered in the literature in the last
years. Specially relevant in this ﬁeld is the work by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), who
study the stability and eﬃciency of social and economic networks; in their work they do
not formally model the procedure through which a graph is formed. There are also studies
which explicitly analyze the dynamic process of network formation. Consider for example
Bala and Goyal (2000), Jackson and Watts (1998), and Watts (2001). In these models
agents only decide about link formation and there are no other actions that inﬂuence their
payoﬀs. We ﬁnd in the literature of network formation two kind of models, regarding how
agents bear the cost of the links: (i) the one-sided models, that are characterized by the
fact that the agent who proposes to form a link meets the entire cost; (ii) the two-sided
models, in which the two agents involved in a link share the cost in equal amount. In
the setup of social coordination games (where our research ﬁts) Goyal and Vega-Redondo
(2000) propose a model of the ﬁrst kind; among the second ones, we ﬁnd Jackson and
Watts (1999) and Droste, Gilles and Johnson (2000)1. Both kinds of models (one-sided
and two-sided) consider exogenous the part of the cost each agent bears in a link (either
all or one half of the cost). Nevertheless, it is reasonable to argue that when two players
have the possibility to form (or maintain) a link, the one who will get a greater payoﬀ
from it will be willing to meet a higher part of the cost in order to form the link. The
endogenization of the distribution of the cost provides our model with two important
advantages over the former ones: (i) whenever a link is proﬁtable (the sum of the payoﬀs
of two agents from a link is higher than the cost it involves) the link will form, which in
1This work introduces a spatial location of agents.
3fact will result in a higher connectivity; and (ii) the cost born by each player in a certain
link will depend on the relative payoﬀso fb o t ha g e n t si n v o l v e di ni t .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 provides an adaptation of the Nash bargaining solution to our model. Section 4 ana-
lyzes the static game. Section 5 introduces a dynamic process and studies the stochastic
stability. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
Let N = {1,2,...,n} be the set of players, where n ≥ 2. We assume agents to be risk
neutral. The model is a two-stage game where, in the ﬁrst stage, each player i ∈ N
chooses an action ai from his available action space Ai = A = {α,β} ∀i ∈ N.T h e n ,
after observing the pattern of actions, in the second stage, link formation follows from the
Nash bargaining solution. To characterize the conditions for a link to form, ﬁrst we have
to deﬁne which are the beneﬁts and costs it implies for the involved players. Given the
actions, chosen by any two players i and j, the establishment of a link ij between them
conveys:
(i) a gross payoﬀ for the agents given by the symmetric function π : A × A →  +.






where the entries represent the payoﬀsf o rp l a y e ri, π(ai,a j),a n df o rp l a y e rj, π(aj,a i),
given the actions ai ∈ A and aj ∈ A they chose respectively. The following conditions
hold:
d>f , b>e , d>b , b+ f>d+ e (1)
4The conditions d>fand b>ereﬂect the fact that π(·) represents the payoﬀ matrix
of a 2x2 symmetric coordination game; d>bmeans that (α,α) is the Pareto eﬃcient
equilibrium of this game; and b + f>d+ e that (β,β) is the risk dominant equilibrium
as deﬁned by Harsanyi and Selten (1988).
(ii) Additionally, the establishment of the link ij implies a ﬁxed cost c>0 that has
to be born in some feasible way, c = cij +cji, between the involved players. cij represents
the part of the cost paid by player i in the link ij and cji the share paid by player j.W e
impose the following conditions: cij ≥ 0 and cji ≥ 0. Therefore, in this model, we do not
allow agents to subsidize others in order to form a link.2
We propose that both link formation and cost sharing result from the Nash bargaining
solution, i.e. we take an axiomatic approach for the second stage of the game. This allows
us to make the analysis quite general as we do not deﬁne explicitly a bargaining procedure.
Given a pattern of actions a =( a1,a 2,...,an), for any i,j ∈ N,w ed e ﬁne gi,j(a) ∈ {0,1}
as follows: gi,j(a)=1if, according to the Nash solution, players i and j form a link, given
the actions ai and aj, and gi,j(a)=0otherwise.3 Note that we ﬁx gii =0 , ∀i ∈ N as in
this model it makes no sense that a player forms a link with herself. Given this notation,
for any a, we can represent the set of links in which player i is involved by the following
vector: gi(a)=( gi,1(a),g i2(a)...,gin(a)).N o t et h a tg(a): =( g1(a),g 2(a),...,g n(a)) results
in a network structure. We will obtain an expression for gi,j(a) in the next section when
we apply the Nash bargaining solution to our model.
Given a pattern of actions, the total payoﬀ, Πi(ai,a −i),ap l a y e ri ∈ N gets in this
model is the sum of the payoﬀs she gets from all her formed links net of the shares of the
cost she pays (according to the Nash bargaining solution), i.e.4
2Note that cij < 0 would convey that player i gets additional proﬁts from the link ij which, as
cij + cji = c, she would receive from player j.
3Note that gi,j(a)=gj,i(a) for any i,j ∈ N.
4Note that cij is not deﬁned when the link ij is not formed. In order to precisely state expression
(2), assume without loss of generality that in this case cij = c
2. This does not have any inﬂuence on the




gi,j(a) · [π(ai,a j) − cij]. (2)
The following example gives an intuition to our model5. Consider a group N =
{1,2,...,n} of researchers. Each researcher has to decide a type of software to work
with, denoted by ai. Suppose they have to choose between using Mathematica (ai = α)
or Matlab (ai = β). Once each agent has chosen her software, which can be observed
by all of them, each possible pair of researchers decide wether they are going to work
together or not. The earnings from interacting for two agents, π(ai,a j) and π(aj,a i),
are represented by the payoﬀs of a bilateral symmetric coordination game as described
above, where the actions are identiﬁe dw i t ht h ek i n do fs o f t w a r ec h o s e n .W ea s s u m et h a t
two researchers using the same software can exchange more information, which beneﬁts
them. Suppose, just to illustrate the example, that the choice of Mathematica (action
α)i se ﬃcient, meaning that any two linked agents using this software get the maximum
possible earnings. We say the choice of Matlab (action β) is risk-dominant in the sense
that it provides a higher expected payoﬀ to an agent who has no information about which
software will be used by the others, and therefore assigns equal probability to both kinds.
Interaction between two researchers has a cost c; think for example in costs of phone calls,
travelling to meet, mail, etc. Thus, any two researchers have to bear this cost if they want
to work together. They bargain over the share of the cost that each one is going to pay (cij
and cji), knowing the magnitude of the earnings they would get and the fact that, if they
do not reach an agreement, they will not interact. Finally, the total payoﬀ a researcher
gets is the sum of her earnings over all her interactions net of the shares of the costs she
pays.
To solve for the equilibria of this model we use the backward induction argument. In
section 3 we specify, taken as given a pattern of actions a, how the Nash solution induces
the network links and the corresponding sharing of costs. That is, we will determine under
which conditions a link ij forms (i.e. each gi,j(a) will be obtained), and how the involved
players share the cost (i.e. the corresponding cij and cji). Then, in section 4, relying on
5This example is an adaptation from the coauthor model proposed by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).
6this result, we characterize the pattern of actions that arises in equilibrium.
3 Bargaining the distribution of the link cost
In this section we analyze when any two agents form a link and how they share the ﬁxed
cost c that it conveys. This cost sharing depends on the actions chosen by any of the two
players in the ﬁrst stage and the function π. We propose the Nash bargaining solution
as the most appropriate one to apply in this model, as it reﬂe c t st h eo u t c o m eo faw e l l
deﬁned bargaining process6 and it can be easily applied to our model. Additionally, this
solution displays the feature that the resulting cost division will depend on the payoﬀ
each agent can get, that is, we will see that the agent receiving a higher gross beneﬁtf r o m
the link bears a higher part of the cost. We have to adapt our model to be able to apply
the Nash solution, as the latter is deﬁned to study the sharing of positive beneﬁts among
two players and, instead, what we have to analyze here is how players share costs. As we
explain below, this adaptation will be done by deﬁning the feasible net payoﬀ set, over
which players will bargain.
3.1 The Nash bargaining solution
First, we will brieﬂy explain how the Nash bargaining solution works. A bargaining
problem is characterized by a pair (X,d) in which X represents the feasible payoﬀ pairs
and d is the pair of payoﬀs resulting from disagreement. The problem is deﬁned for the
set of pairs (X,d) that satisfy that X is convex, closed and bounded above (free disposal
is allowed). This set of all possible bargaining problems is denoted by B. A bargaining
solution is a function F : B →  2 with the property that for all (X,d) ∈ B, F(X,d) ∈ X.
6This axiomatic aproach could be conceived as a simpliﬁcation of a bargaining model a là Rubinstein,
i.e. when two players have the possibility of forming a link, they strategically bargain the distribution
of the cost by way of an inﬁnite sequence of alternating oﬀers, say with some time discount or risk of
breakdown. It is well known that the limit of the outcome when the discount factor tends to one coincides
with the Nash bargaining solution (cf. Osborne and Rubinstein (1990)).
7F(X,d) is interpreted as the pair of payoﬀs on which two players would agree when they
face the bargaining problem (X,d).
The Nash Bargaining Solution is characterized as follows,
s =argmax
x∈X, x≥d
(x1 − d1) · (x2 − d2).
For more details on this matter see e.g. Osborne and Rubinstein (1990). A graphical
illustration is provided in Figure 1.
Figure 1: the Nash bargaining solution
In our case, the disagreement value d is (0,0).7 We consider the frontier of X being
linear or piece-wise linear. This property, as we will see below, will fully characterize all
the cases in our model. In the examples of Figure 2, some of these cases are graphically
illustrated.
Now we turn to our original model, where players do not have to share payoﬀsb u t
costs.
7Note that this is the payoﬀ vector from a particular link when two players decide not to form it.
8Figure 2: the linear and piece-wise linear cases
3.2 Adaptation of the Nash bargaining solution to the cost-
sharing model
Consider a pair of agents say, i,j ∈ N, who have respectively chosen actions ai,a j ∈
{α,β}. We now set the condition for the link ij to form (i.e. we obtain an expression for
gij(a)) and the corresponding sharing of the cost (i.e. cij and cji). We denote the net
beneﬁts for the agents i and j from this link as   π(ai,a j,c ij) and   π(aj,a i,c ji) respectively,
deﬁned as:




π(ai,a j) − cij if the link ij is formed
0 otherwise
and




π(aj,a i) − cji if the link ij is formed
0 otherwise
;
where π(ai,a j) and π(aj,a i) represent the payoﬀs obtained respectively by each of
them from the 2x2 symmetric coordination game (cf. Table 1).
The necessary condition for players i and j to form a link, requires that, given the
action chosen by each of the two players, the following inequality hold:
πi(ai,a j)+πj(ai,a j) ≥ c. (3)
9This is, when the aggregate gross payoﬀ of both players from the link exceeds the
cost it conveys8 there exist some surplus over which players i and j c a nb a r g a i n .I nt h i s
situation they will have to agree on how to divide c into cij and cji. Obviously, an agent
would not let the link to form if the cost she has to bear exceeds the gross beneﬁts she
obtains from it. This is, if (3) is satisﬁed, both players will establish the link, sharing the
cost in a way such that π(ai,a j) ≥ cij,a n dπ(aj,a i) ≥ cji. In addition, as we have gotten
the condition under which a link forms, we can state an explicit expression for the term
gi,j(a), deﬁned in Section 2:




1 if π(ai,a j)+π(aj,a i) ≥ c
0 otherwise
Now we deﬁne the bargaining problem (X,d) between players i and j. The disagree-
ment value for each player is equal to 0 as this is the net payoﬀ they obtain if the link is
not formed, i.e. d =( 0 ,0). The set of feasible net payoﬀsp a i r si s
X =

     
     
(  πi,  πj) ∈  2
+ s.t.
  πi +   πj ≤ π(ai,a j)+π(aj,a i) − c
  πi ≤ π(ai,a j)
  πj ≤ π(aj,a i)

     
     
, (4)
where, for notational convenience, we have denoted   πi =   π(ai,a j,c ij) and   πj =
  π(aj,a i,c ji). Recall that players bargain how to split the cost of the link, but in this
model we do not allow for side payments among the agents. For this reason a player
cannot get from a link a net payoﬀ exceeding her gross payoﬀ (i.e.   πi ≤ π(ai,a j) and
  πj ≤ π(aj,a i)).9 This is, the maximal (net) payoﬀ agent i can get from the link ij (given
the respective actions) is π(ai,a j), which corresponds to the situation in which agent j
completely meets the cost of the link. In Figure 3 we can see depicted the set of feasible
payoﬀs X,f o rt h ed i ﬀerent possible relations among π(ai,a j), π(aj,a i) and c.10
8Note that expression (3) may be rewritten as   π(ai,a j,c ij)+  π(aj,a i,c ji) ≥ 0,s i n c ecij + cji = c.
9Otherwise, if we allowed for transfers, the form of the set X will be always as depicted in ﬁgure 3(a),
irrespective of whether the values of πi(ai,a j) and πi(ai,a j) are higher or lower than c.A l s on o t et h a t
these conditions are equivalent to min{cij,c ji} ≥ 0.
10In the ﬁgure we use the following notation: πi = π(ai,a j) and πj = π(ai,a j).
10Figure 3: possible net feasible payoﬀ sets depending on c, π(ai,a j),π(aj,a i).
11N o ww et u r nt oc a l c u l a t et h ev a l u e so fcij and cji resulting from the disagreement
value d =( 0 ,0) and the set X as deﬁned by (4). First we characterize the payoﬀsn e to f
costs (  πi and   πj)t h a tp l a y e r si and j respectively obtain from the link ij, in case it is
formed. We apply the Nash bargaining solution:
  π
N =a r g m a x
  πN∈X,   πN≥d
(  πi − di) · (  πj − dj) = argmax
  πN∈X,   πN≥d
  πi ·   πj
Proposition 1 Consider any i,j ∈ N
(i) If π(ai,a j)+π(aj,a i) ≥ c,t h el i n kij will form and the net beneﬁts for the agents
(  πi and   πj)w i l lb ea sf o l l o w s :
  πi =m a x {π(ai,a j) − c,min{
1
2
(π(ai,a j)+π(aj,a i) − c),π(ai,a j)}}
  πj =m a x {π(aj,a i) − c,min{
1
2
(π(aj,a i)+π(ai,a j) − c),π(aj,a i)}}
(ii) If π(ai,a j)+π(aj,a i) <c , the link does not form (therefore   πi =   πj =0 ).
T h ep r o o fi sg i v e ni nt h ea p p e n d i x .
As a direct consequence of this proposition, we can state the next result, which speciﬁes
how the cost of a link is split between the two players who form it.
Corollary 1 If the link ij forms, the cost c will be split between agents i and j in the fol-
lowing way: cij =m i n {c,max{1
2[π(ai,a j)+c−π(aj,a i)],0}} and cji =m i n {c,max{1
2[π(aj,a i)+
c − π(ai,a j)],0}}.
W eg e tt h i sr e s u l tf r o mt h ef a c tt h a tcij = π(ai,a j)−  πi and cji = π(aj,a i)−  πj. Note
that, in any case, cij + cji = c. We can observe that the cost an agent will pay for a
link will be weakly increasing in the payoﬀ she will get from it and weakly decreasing in
the payoﬀ of the other player, in the sense that the higher (lower) her payoﬀ (the other
player’s payoﬀ), the non-lower (non-higher) her share of the cost. This is, cij is weakly
increasing in π(ai,a j) and c, and weakly decreasing in π(aj,a i). Thus, due to the nature
of the Nash Bargaining Solution, we obtain the cost sharing outcome depends on the gross
payoﬀ each player can obtain from a link.
124 The reduced game: translation to payoﬀ matrices
Let us recall how the game works. First, each player chooses an action ai from his available
action space A = {α,β}. Then, the formation of each possible link is bargained according
to the Nash solution, where the set of feasible agreements X is as deﬁned by (4) and
players obtain the disagreement value d if they do not form the link. Thus, given the
pattern of actions a,w eo b t a i n{gij(a),c ij} for all i,j ∈ N. Therefore, using backward
induction, we can construct new bilateral games that include all the former considerations
and thus identify the Nash equilibria of these games.11 The form of the resultant game
will depend on the parameters of our model {d,b,f,e,c}.
In the following result we characterize the equilibrium outcomes of this model. First
of all we mention that each possible combination of players actions a =( a1 × ... × an) ∈
S ≡ An deﬁnes a state. In this model each state s ∈ S results in a network architecture
(pattern of links formed according to the Nash solution), i.e. g(s), and in a distribution
of the cost of these links. Let us introduce some convenient notation. Let ge denote the
empty network, i.e. the case in which no link is formed and gc the complete network, i.e.
the architecture in which all possible (pairwise) links are formed. Let S∗ be the set of
equilibrium states. Denote by sα and sβ the states in which all players are choosing the
same action (all α or all β respectively), i.e. sα =( α,...,α) and sβ =( β,...,β).N o ww e
can state the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (i) If c<min{f − e,2(b − e)},t h e nS∗ = {sα,s β}
(ii) If 2(b − e) <c<f− e, then S∗ = {sα}
(iii) If {[f − e<c<2b] ∧ [f + e<2b]},t h e nS∗ = {sα,s β}
(iv) If {[f − e<c<f+ e] ∧ [f + e>2b]},t h e nS∗ = {sα}
(v) If max{2b,f + e} <c<2d,t h e nS∗ = {sα,s β}
(vi) If c>2d,t h e nS∗ = S
11Note that, if we consider the second stage (network formation) as a subgame, we are in essence
analysing the Subgame Perfect Equilibria of the original game.
13Proof:
Let us ﬁrst consider the case in which c<f− e.
In this case, resulting from the Nash Solution (in view of Corollary 1), we see that: (i)
when both agents involved in a link are choosing the same action (ai = aj), and therefore
π(ai,a j)=π(aj,a i), the cost of a link will be equally shared: ci,j = cj,i = c/2 (provided
that 2b>c ,w h e nt h i sa c t i o ni sai = aj = β, as otherwise the link would not form12 and
both players would get a zero-payoﬀ from that “potential” link); and (ii) when the two
players involved in a link are choosing diﬀerent actions (for example ai = α and aj = β),
the part of the cost each of them will meet (applying the Nash bargaining solution) is:
cα =0 cβ = c,
w h e r ew ed e n o t eb ycα the part of the cost of the link born by the α-player and cβ the




β f − c max{2b−c
2 ,0}
T a b l e2 :g a m eL( l o wc o s t ) ,w h e nc<f− e
This game (game L) has two pure-strategy (strict) Nash equilibria -(α,α),(β,β)-o n l y
when c<2(b − e). T h i sp r o v e s( i ) . W h e n2(b − e) <c<f− e game L has a unique
(strict) Nash equilibria (α,α). This proves (ii).
Now consider the case in which the cost c is such that f − e<c .
Then, again from Corollary 1, we get that: (i) if both agents are choosing the same
action, each of them will bear half of the cost ci,j = cj,i = c/2 (provided that 2b>cand
2d>c ,w h e nt h i sa c t i o ni sβ or α respectively, as otherwise the link would not form and
both players would get a zero-payoﬀ from that “potential” link); and (ii) when the two
p l a y e r si n v o l v e di nal i n ka r ec h o o s i n gd i ﬀerent actions (and provided that f + e>c ,a s
12Note that, in this case, π(ai,a j)+π(aj,a i)=2 b.
13So if we assume, without loss of generality, that player i is the α-player in the link ij (and player j
the β-player), then cα = cij and cβ = cji.
14otherwise the link would not form), the part of the cost each of them will meet (applying


















Table 3: game H (high cost), when c>f− e
This game (game H) has two pure-strategy (strict) Nash equilibria -(α,α),(β,β)-a n d
therefore is a coordination game, only when {[f −e<c<2b]∧[f +e<2b]}.T h i sp r o v e s
(iii).
When {[f − e<c<f+ e] ∧ [f + e>2b]}, game H has an unique (strict) Nash
equilibrium (α,α). This proves (iv).
T os h o w( v )w eh a v ej u s tt on o t et h a t ,g i v e nt h a tmax{2b,f + e} <c<2d,g a m eH





Thus, it has a strict Nash equilibrium (α,α) and the equilibrium (in weakly dominated
strategies) (β,β). The latter equilibrium corresponds to the situation in which both players
choose action β and the link does not form. Only in case all the population is choosing
action β the resulting state would be an equilibrium.
Part (vi) is trivial since, whenever c>2d no proposed link will form as there is no way
to split the cost among two players without making (at least) one of them get a negative
proﬁt. Thus, regardless of the pattern of actions chosen, the empty network arises as an
equilibrium.
To complete the proof it is necessary to show that there are no equilibrium states in
which some agents are using action α and others action β. This is, to show that there are
15no equilibrium states in which the proportion of agents using each action in the population
replicates a mixed strategy Nash equilibria of the 2x2 game (game H or game L). This is
shown by next lemma:
Lemma 1 Assume c<2d. Consider an equilibrium state of the game s = {ai}i∈N ∈ S∗.
Then ai = aj for any i,j ∈ N.
The proof of the lemma is given in the appendix. This result completes the proof.  
The above Proposition indicates that for high values of the cost, but not so high that
no link would form, either all the agents use the eﬃcient action (α) of the coordination
game, resulting in the complete network; or everybody chooses the risk-dominant action
(β), and no link is formed. For low values of the cost, there are two possible subgame
perfect equilibria; in one of them all agents choose the eﬃcient action and, in the other
one, everybody chooses the risk-dominant action. The complete network arises in both
equilibria.
Next corollary characterizes the network architecture that arises in equilibrium. We
observe that it can be either empty or complete, depending on the value of the cost, and
the considered equilibrium state.
Corollary 2 An equilibrium network is either complete or empty. The equilibrium states
for the regions (i)-(vi) of the parameter space, considered in Proposition 2, result in the
following networks:
(i)-(iv) g(s)=gc ∀s ∈ S∗
(v) g(sα)=gc and g(sβ)=ge
(vi) g(s)=ge ∀s ∈ S∗
This result follows from Lemma 1 and the fact that a link ij is formed if and only if
expression (3) holds. It shows that in this model, either all pairs of agents get connected
(if the cost is not too high) or nobody establishes any link. There are no equilibrium
16states with coexistence of diﬀerent components (i.e. disjoint groups of players completely
connected among themselves but having no connections with players in other groups).
T h i sr e l i e so nt h ef a c tt h a tw h e nc<2d any equilibrium requires that all agents choose
t h es a m ea c t i o n .
Remark 1 Given any s ∈ S∗, whenever gij(s)=1 , then cij = cji = c
2. This result follows
from Lemma 1.
Thus, whenever in equilibrium there exists interaction among players (resulting in gc),
each player bears half of the cost of any link in which she gets involved. Note that the oﬀ
equilibrium behavior (i.e. when agents choose diﬀerent actions), which results in sharing
the cost in diﬀerent amounts, is relevant to obtain the equilibria characterization.
Observe that, in this section, we have deﬁned two possible bilateral games in which
net payoﬀs are considered: game L and game H (cf. Table 2 and Table 3), depending on
the region of the parameter space. Let us refer to the corresponding game (game H or
game L depending on whether c ≷ f − e)a st h econstituent game.14
5D y n a m i c s
Time is considered discrete, t =1 ,2,... At each t, the state of the system is given by
s(t)=a(t) ∈ S,w h e r ea(t) represents the pattern of actions chosen by the agents in this
period and g(a(t)) is the resulting network architecture of formed links according to the
Nash solution. Assume the system starts from any initial state s(0) ∈ S.E v e r y p e r i o d
each player receives a chance to revise her action with a positive independent probability
p ∈ (0,1). The structure of a player’s revision is: ﬁrst she chooses action, and then all her
links (already existing and potential ones) are updated according to the Nash solution.
This implies that if there exists at least one player who changes her action at period t
14Hence, throughout the paper, whenever c<f−e the “constituent game” will refer to game L (deﬁned
in Table 2) and, when c>f− e, the “constituent game” will refer to game H (deﬁn e di nT a b l e3 ) .
17(i.e. a(t)  = a(t − 1)), then players will maintain/form those links which satisfy (3) at
the current period and sever/not form those ones which do not, being the cost sharing
determined by the action proﬁle of period t. The intuition is that, even if only a subset of
the population receives the revision opportunity at some period, once these players have
chosen the new action all the possible links are renegotiated.15 Given that, we assume
that a revising player will select an action
ai(t) ∈ arg max
ai∈A
Πi(ai,a −i(t − 1)),
this is, her optimal action given the strategy conﬁguration resulting from last pe-
riod (i.e. a myopic best response), and the fact that she knows that links costs will be
(re)negotiated. When there are more that one best response we will consider that any of
them is chosen with equal probability.16 The proposed dynamics deﬁnes a Markov chain
on S. I fw ed e n o t eb yQ the induced transition matrix, and µt ∈ ∆(S) the probability
measure over the state space S in period t,w eh a v eµt = µt−1·Q = µ0·Qt.W ed e ﬁne the
s e to fl i m i ts t a t e sof this process as S = {s ∈ S :lim
t→∞ µ · Qt(s) > 0 for some µ ∈ ∆(S)}
where µ · Qt(s) denotes the probability associated to state s by the probability measure
µ · Qt over the state space.
L e tu si n t r o d u c es o m ec o n v e n i e n tn o t a t i o n . L e tnt−1
α be the number of players who
chose action α at period t − 117 and n
t−1
β = n − nt−1
α .D e n o t eb yνaa the payoﬀ of the
constituent game (cf. footnote 14) of a player choosing action a  ∈ A against a player
choosing an action a   ∈ A. Finally let λ
t
a ∈ {0,1,...,nt−1
a } be the number of agents who
chose action a ∈ A at period t − 1 and receive a revision opportunity at period t.
The next result characterizes the set of limit states of this unperturbed system.
Proposition 3 (i) If c<min{f − e,2(b − e)},t h e nS = {sα,s β}
15We could conceive heuristically a link as a kind of contract established between two players relying
on the standards they have chosen. If one player changes the standard, the conditions of the contract
change and therefore it has to be renegotiated.
16Note that this implies that if the revising player was actually chosing an action which is a best
response, she will not neccesarily continue to use the same action.
17Note that, at period t, players can observe nt−1
α .
18(ii) If {[f − e<c<2b] ∧ [f + e<2b]}, then S = {sα,s β}
(iii) If c<2d and neither (i) nor (ii) holds, then S = {sα}
(vi) If c>2d,t h e nS = S
Proof:
Note that, throughout this dynamics, players revising the strategy follow a myopic
best response and, when the action proﬁle changes from one period to another, all links
are (re)negotiated according to the current pattern of actions and the Nash solution.
This implies that an agent, say i, when revising her action at period t, will choose ai(t)
considering that she will play this action, in the constituent game, against each agent
j ∈ N \{ i}, taking as given a−i(t − 1) = (a1,...,ai−1,a i+1,...,an).
Let us ﬁrst consider the cases in which the constituent game has an unique Nash
equilibrium (α,α), this is, when 2(b−e) <c<f−e or {[f −e<c<f+e]∧[f +e>2b]}.
Regardless n0
α, at any period t ≥ 1, the best responses of all players who are revising their
strategies prescribe to choose action α. Hence, the system converges to the state in which
all players choose the eﬃcient action α and every link is formed.
When max{2b,f + e} <c<2d, the candidates to be limit states of the dynamics
are the equilibrium states S∗ = {sα,s β}, we obtained in Proposition 2, with g(sα)=gc
and g(sβ)=ge.I nt h i sc a s e ,i fn0
α ≥ 1 then, at any period t ≥ 1, the best responses of
all players who are revising their strategies prescribe to choose action α. If n0
α =0 , at
period t =1 , there are two best responses for any agent who is revising her strategy: to
choose either α or β. Note that we assumed that each of those best responses are chosen
w i t hp o s i t i v ep r o b a b i l i t y( c f .f o o t n o t e1 6 ) .T h u sw eh a v et w op o s s i b i l i t i e s :E i t h e rn1
α ≥ 1
or n1
α =0 . In the former case, at any period t ≥ 2, the best responses of all players
who are revising their strategies prescribe to choose action α. In the latter case we have
again two best responses (α or β), both of which are chosen with positive probability, but
throughout the dynamics, eventually, at some ﬁnite T, we will obtain nT
α ≥ 1, and hence,
at any period t ≥ T +1, the best responses of all players who are revising their strategies
prescribe to choose action α. Thus, the system converges to the state in which all players
choose the eﬃcient action α and every link is formed. This proves (iii).
19Consider those situations where the constituent game has two strict Nash equilibria
—(α,α) and (β,β)-.This is, when either c<min{f − e,2(b − e)} or {[f − e<c<
2b]∧[f +e<2b]}. Generically we can have four possible cases, depending on n0
α, i.e. the
number of α − players in the initial state s(0). We show convergence to either sα or sβ :
(Case 1) (n0
α − 1)ναα + n0
βναβ > (n0














The best response of any player i ∈ N, who gets an opportunity to revise her action at
period 1, prescribes the choice of action α, regardless of whether a0
i was α or β.T h u sf r o m
period 1 onwards, any player will choose α when revising her action, which eventually
will converge to the state sα.
(Case 2) (n0
α − 1)ναα + n0
βναβ < (n0














The best response of any player i ∈ N, who gets an opportunity to revise her action at
period 1, prescribes to choose action β, regardless of whether a0
i was α or β.T h u sf r o m
period 1 onwards, any player will choose β when revising her action, which eventually will
converge to the state sβ.
(Case 3) (n0
α − 1)ναα + n0
βναβ > (n0














Note that this case is not possible, as the two inequalities are incompatible in these
parameter ranges. This is shown in the proof of Lemma 1.
(Case 4) (n0
α − 1)ναα + n0
βναβ < (n0














The best response of any player i ∈ N prescribes the choice of action a1
i  = a0
i.W e




β, when players revise their action at period 1, they
will switch from the action they had at the initial state. Thus, we obtain in period 2 a




β, by the same argument,














β, and hence convergence to sβ or sα, respectively. This
proves (i) and (ii).
20Finally consider c>2d. In this case, at any period t, no link is formed regardless the
chosen pattern of actions. Hence, all s ∈ S are limit states. This proves (iv) and, hence,
completes the proof.  
Next Corollary characterizes the network architectures arising at limit states.
Corollary 3 The limit states characterized in Proposition 3 result in the following net-
works:
If c<2d, g(s)=gc ∀s ∈ S
If c>2d, g(s)=ge ∀s ∈ S
Note that, when c<2d, only in case max{2b,f +e} <c<2d the empty network can
arise in an equilibrium of the game. But we have shown that, in this case, the unique
limit state is sα, and hence the complete network forms. Thus, for any c<2d any limit
state s ∈ S results in the complete network
We observe then that, in some cases, we have multiplicity of limit states of the
unperturbed dynamics, in the sense that there are parameter conﬁgurations for which
S = {sα,s β}. To handle the problem of equilibrium selection in those cases, and thus
study the nature of long run outcomes, we will characterize the set of stochastically stable
states of this model. We rely on the approach proposed by Kandori, Mailath and Rob
(1993), and Young (1993). We allow for mutations, interpreted as the possibility of players
making errors when implementing their choices on actions; i.e. with a small probability
ε > 0, a player chooses his action at random when revising his strategy.18 For any ε > 0,
the process deﬁnes a Markov Chain on S, with transition matrix Qε, which is aperiodic
and irreducible and, therefore, it has a unique invariant probability distribution (cf. Frei-
dlin and Wentzell (1984)). Let µε stand for this invariant distribution (µε · Qε = µε),
and deﬁne   µ =lim
ε→0 µε, i.e. the limit of the invariant probability distribution when the
18Note that we do not allow for mutation in link formation, as we are considering an axiomatic approach
for this process. In any case, the consideration that with small probability γ > 0, the formation of a link
is reversed wouldn’t aﬀect the results.
21probability of mistake ε converges to zero. We say that a state s ∈ S is stochastically
stable when it is in the support of   µ, i.e. when   µ(s) > 0.
Let the set of stochastically stable states be denoted by   S ≡ {s ∈ S :ˆ µ(s) > 0}. In
t h ef o l l o w i n gp r o p o s i t i o nw ec h a r a c t e r i z et h i ss e t . 19
Proposition 4 (i) If c<(b + f) − (d + e),t h e n  S = {sβ}.
(ii) If (b + f) − (d + e) <c<2d,t h e n  S = {sα}.
(iii) If c>2d,t h e n  S = S
Proof:
Part (iii) is trivial since, when c>2d, it is not proﬁtable to form any possible link,
so g(s)=ge for any s ∈   S. Thus any state is in the support of the limit of the invariant
probability distribution.
Note that when c<(b + f) − (d + e), the constituent game corresponds to game L
((b + f) − (d + e) <f− e). We can see that, under this parameter conﬁguration, the
situation is completely equivalent to that in which each agent is playing game L with every
other player in the population (i.e. like a round robin context). When c<(b+f)−(d+e),
game L has two pure-strategy strict Nash Equilibria: the eﬃcient one (α,α),a n dt h er i s k -
dominant one (β,β). Under this setting of 2x2 symmetric games with two Nash equilibria
where one of them is risk-dominant, in which total connectivity is guaranteed, Kandori,
Mailath and Rob (1993) (KMR hereafter) show that the risk dominant equilibrium prevails
as the stochastically stable state. We then refer to this result to prove (i).
N o ww ea n a l y z et h ec a s ew h e r e(b+f)−(d+e) <c<2d. By the same reasoning used
above, we can consider that the situation is analogous to a round robin context where
players play either game L (if c<f− e)o rg a m eH( i fc>f− e).
If (b + f) − (d + e) <c<2(b − e), players play game L. In this case game L has
two pure-strategy strict Nash equilibria {(α,α),(β,β)}, but (α,α) is both eﬃcient and
risk-dominant; hence the result of KMR applies, and sα is the unique stochastically stable
state.
19Note that   S ⊆ S.
22If 2(b − e) <c<f− e game L has a unique Nash equilibrium (α,α) and hence
  S = {sα}.
If {[f −e<c<2b]∧[f +e<2b]}, game H has two pure strategy strict Nash equilibria
{(α,α),(β,β)} but (α,α) is both eﬃcient and risk-dominant; hence the result of KMR
applies, and sα is the unique stochastically stable state.
If either {[f −e<c<f+e]∧[f +e>2b]} or max{2b,f +e} <c<2d, game H has a
unique pure-strategy strict Nash equilibrium (α,α) and hence   S = {sα}. It follows then
that (ii) applies. This completes the proof  
First, we observe that the network architecture which arises from a stochastically
stable state s ∈   S is g(s)=gc when c<2d and g(s)=ge when c>2d. Second, we
obtain a treshold for the cost   c =( b + f) − (d + e) above which the eﬃcient action is
chosen and below which the risk-dominant action is selected. This result is quite intuitive
since the treshold coincides with the risk-dominance premium. This is, for a cost higher
than the diﬀerence between the sum of payoﬀs of the risk dominant action (b + f) and
the sum of payoﬀso ft h ee ﬃcient action (d+e), the eﬃcient action is selected, meanwhile
otherwise the selected action is the risk dominant one. This implies that the higher this
diﬀerence is (what heuristically we could interpret as the degree of risk dominance of
action β in the bilateral coordination game) the higher the treshold. Therefore the higher
t h el i n kc o s tm u s tb ef o rt h es e l e c t i o no ft h ee ﬃcient outcome in the long run. Finally
note that this treshold is always positive as we are assuming that (1) holds.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
We have proposed a two stage model in which all agents decide strategically on choosing
a standard, which represents an action for a coordination game. After these choices, in
a second stage, each possible pair of players decides whether to form a link, meeting the
cost it involves, or not. This stage results in a bargaining problem over the net payoﬀs.
We use the Nash bargaining solution to deﬁne the outcome of this problem. This results
in a network architecture where the necessary and suﬃcient condition for a link to form
23is that the aggregate gross payoﬀ of the involved agents exceed the cost of the link. Each
player gets a total payoﬀ equal to the sum of the net payoﬀss h eo b t a i n sf r o ma l lo fh e r
links. We present the scenario in which there exists a trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency and
risk, this is, the bilateral coordination game has two Nash equilibria, one eﬃcient and
other risk-dominant. The fact that players bargain on the formation of a link is highly
important for the results of this paper and the main contribution to the literature on
network formation.
We have characterized the equilibrium states of this model, and we have shown that
there exist regions of the parameter space characterized by multiple equilibria, with re-
spect to the actions chosen by the agents. Two states emerge as equilibria, the state in
which everybody chooses the eﬃcient action and the state in which every agent chooses
the risk-dominant one. It is shown that in equilibrium all players coordinate in the same
action. We obtain that only the complete network and the empty one can arise in equi-
librium. When the cost of the link is too high the empty network arises, meanwhile lower
costs result in the complete network. To deal with the problem of equilibrium selection
we have introduced a dynamics and analyzed the sets of stochastically stable states. We
have characterized a treshold for the cost of the link and shown that, below this treshold,
the risk-dominant state is selected. If the cost of the link lies above this treshold, but
not so high that no link is proﬁtable, the eﬃcient state is selected. The value of the
treshold in our model coincides with the risk-dominance premium, i.e. it can heuristically
be interpreted as the degree of risk-dominance of the ineﬃcient action in the coordination
game. In this sense, the higher the sum of the payoﬀs associated to this action in the
2x2 game with respect to the eﬃcient action, the higher this treshold will be. Thus the
value of the risk-dominance premium determines the region of the cost space for which
the (ineﬃcient) risk dominant outcome is selected in the long run.
We can relate our results to Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2000) who consider an one-sided
model, and to Jackson an Watts (1999), who suppose a two-sided model. In both cases,
they obtain that when the cost of link formation is low the risk dominant equilibrium is
selected as stochastically stable. Instead, when cost are high, the former model selects
the eﬃcient equilibrium but, in the latter one, both the risk-dominant and the eﬃcient
24equilibria coexist. Surprisingly the results about equilibrium selection we obtain are closer
to Goyal and Vega-Redondo, even though, at least intuitively, the distribution of the cost
we propose is closer to the two-sided than to the one-sided model. To see this, note that,
in our setup, the distribution of the cost in equilibrium coincides with the two sided model
( c f .R e m a r k1 ) .T h i si sd u et ot h ef a c tt h a tp l a y e r sc h o o s et h es a m ea c t i o ni ne q u i l i b r i u m
and, hence, each of them bears half of the cost. In contrast, in the one-sided case, in each
link only one player completely meets the cost. We can point some reasons to explain
this fact:
To compare with the results of Jackson and Watts, we have to note that, on the one
hand, the oﬀ equilibrium behavior is crucial when stochastic stability is analyzed, as it
determines the probabilities of transitions between diﬀerent equilibrium states. In this
respect, our model is quite diﬀerent to theirs, as the two-sided model they use maintains
the equally shared costs regardless of the action proﬁle, meanwhile in our model these
shares are adjusted with the pattern of actions. On the other hand, Jackson an Watts
propose a dynamic model in which the opportunities of revision of actions and links are
drawn independently, whereas in our model, when actions are revised, links (and cost
shares) are automatically updated.
Instead, Goyal and Vega-Redondo propose a model in which, when a player receives a
revision opportunity, she can change both actions and links, which is done simultaneously.
In our approach a player revision aﬀects both the action proﬁle and the network, as in their
case, but in a diﬀerent way: in our setup, the actions determine the network structure.
A sw em e n t i o n e da b o v e ,a ni m p o r t a n td i ﬀerence with their model relies on the cost of
the links: given their setup the player who decides to form a link pays the entire cost,
and hence they use a purely non-cooperative approach. In our case, the creation of a link
requires the consent of both players, and, in fact, the cost is shared equally in equilibrium.
Finally, we remark the fact that the bargaining setup, we propose, results in a clear-
cut treshold for the cost with an intuitive interpretation; the degree of risk dominance
determines the spaces in which each state (the eﬃcient and the risk-dominant one) are
selected in the long run.
Now we guide our research to change the structure of the stages of the game, i.e.
25considering that players ﬁrst take decisions about link formation and, after that, they
decide on actions; this is, we suppose that links decisions are more “rigid”. We are
also working on the extension of the features present in our model to networks in which
indirect links are considered. Another aspect to be analyzed is the rate of convergence
of the dynamics in our setup. Other interesting projects we want to develop include the
extension of our results to generic 2x2 games and the study of economic applications of
our model.
267 Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
Part (ii) is straightforward in the sense that if π(ai,a j)+π(aj,a i) <c , any possibility
of splitting the cost between the two agents (c = cij +cji), makes at least one of them to
g e tan e tp a y o ﬀ lower than the disagreement value. Thus, the link would not form.
Let’s go now to part (i). When π(ai,a j)+π(aj,a i) ≥ c,i ti sa l w a y sp o s s i b l et oﬁnd
at least one distribution cij + cji = c such that π(ai,a j) − cij ≥ 0 and π(aj,a i) − cji ≥ 0.
This implies that players would prefer this possibility to disagreement (that conveys zero-




i ,  π
N
j )= a r gm a x
(  πN
i ,  πN
j )∈X, (  πN
i ,  πN
j )≥d
(  πi − di) · (  πj − dj)
to the bargaining problem (X,d), with d =( 0 ,0) and the feasible set X as deﬁned by
(4). Let us see how   πi and   πj are calculated.
Let us suppose, without loss of generality, that π(ai,a j) ≥ π(aj,a i).
We have to consider three possible situations:
(Case 1) π(ai,a j) ≥ c and π(aj,a i) ≥ c
(Case 2) π(ai,a j) ≥ c and π(aj,a i) ≤ c
(Case 3) π(ai,a j) ≤ c and π(aj,a i) ≤ c
But ﬁrst, note that we study maximization problems of the kind

           
           
max
  πi,  πj
H(  πi,  πj)=  πi ·   πj
s.t.
  πi +   πj ≤ π(ai,a j)+π(aj,a i) − c
  πi ≤ π(ai,a j)
  πj ≤ π(aj,a i)
  πi,  πj ≥ 0

           
           
27We obtain that the strictly Pareto-eﬃcient points of X are included in the line   πi+  πj =
π(ai,a j)+π(aj,a i) − c. Thus,
d  πj
d  πi = −1. As the Nash bargaining solution must be a
(strictly) Pareto-eﬃcient point, we have two possibilities:
- If the solution is interior, it must satisfy:
d  πj
d  πi = −
∂H(  πi,  πj)
∂  πi

















- If we have a corner solution, (  π
N
i ,  π
N
j ) will be either (π(ai,a j),π(aj,a i) − c) or
(π(ai,a j) − c,π(aj,a i))
Let’s go now to analyze the three mentioned cases:
In Case 1, the feasible set is deﬁned by
X1 =

     
     
(  πi,  πj) ∈  2
+ s.t.
  πi +   πj ≤ π(ai,a j)+π(aj,a i) − c
  πi ≤ π(ai,a j)
  πj ≤ π(aj,a i)

     
     
and the values of   πi and   πj result from the Nash bargaining solution as
(  π
N












i ft h es o l u t i o ni si n t e r i o r
(π(ai,a j) − c,π(aj,a i)) otherwise
(1)
This case is represented graphically in Figure 4.





(  πi,  πj) ∈  2
+ s.t.
  πi +   πj ≤ π(ai,a j)+π(aj,a i) − c




and the values of   πi and   πj derive from the Nash bargaining solution as
(  π
N












if the solution is interior
(π(ai,a j) − c,π(aj,a i)) otherwise
Finally, in Case 3, the feasible set X3 is deﬁned by





(  πi,  πj) ∈  2
+ s.t.




and the values of   πi and   πj are
(  π
N




π(ai,a j)+π(aj,a i) − c
2
,
π(ai,a j)+π(aj,a i) − c
2
 
Finally, a suitable combination of the results for Cases 1-3, when π(ai,a j) ≥ π(aj,a i),
and the symmetric, we would obtain when π(ai,a j) ≤ π(aj,a i), provides the expressions
for   πi and   πj stated in Proposition 1. This completes the proof.
P r o o fo fL e m m a1
First, we claim that it is not possible to ﬁnd population equilibrium conﬁgurations
with coexistence of conventions (i.e. where there are a group of players choosing action α
and a group of players choosing action β) when, given the region of the parameter space,
the constituent game, which refers to game L or game H (cf. Tables 2 and 3), has a unique
strict Nash equilibrium. For the sake of contradiction assume the constituent game (game
H or game L depending on whether c ≷ f −e) has a unique strict Nash equilibrium (α,α)
and we have a population equilibrium conﬁguration s ∈ S∗ with nα ∈ {1,2,...,n − 1}
players choosing action α and nβ = n − nα players choosing action β. I fw ed e n o t eb y
29νaa the payoﬀ of the constituent game of a player choosing action a  ∈ A against a player
choosing an action a   ∈ A. Then, as (α,α) is the unique strict Nash equilibrium, it must
hold that ναα > νβα and ναβ ≥ νββ. Hence, nαναα +(nβ − 1)ναβ >n ανβα+(nβ − 1)νββ.
But then any β − player would deviate to choose action α, a contradiction with the fact
that the population conﬁguration (nα,n β) is an equilibrium.
T h u s ,w er e s t r i c tt h ea n a l y s i st ot h o s ec a s e sw h e r et h er e s u l t a n tg a m e( Ho rL )h a sa
mixed strategy equilibrium, in which players assign positive probability to both actions,
a n dw es h o wt h a ti nn o n eo ft h e map r o ﬁle with coexistence of diﬀerent actions is an
equilibrium.
We have to consider three situations:
(i) c<2(b − e) (game L)
(ii) {[f − e<c<f+ e] ∧ [f + e<2b]} (game H)
(iii) {[f + e<c<2b] ∧ [f + e<2b]} (game H)
Note that, in situation (i),c<f− e, and hence, the constituent game corresponds
to game L deﬁned above (Table 2); instead, in cases (ii) and (iii), c>f− e, hence, it
corresponds to game H (see Table 3 above).
Let us consider case (i). We will show that it does not exist any equilibrium con-
ﬁguration in which part of the population is playing action α and the remaining agents
action β. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that there is an equilibrium state with
nα ∈ {1,...,n−1} players choosing action α, and nβ = n−nα players choosing action β.





+( N − nα) · e ≥ (N − nα)
2b − c
2
+( nα − 1)(f − c) (6)
(N − nα − 1)
2b − c
2




But note that (6) and (7) result in:




nα ≤ N( 2b−2e−c
2[(d+b)−(e+f)]) − 2b−2e−c
2[(d+b)−(e+f)]
which are incompatible expressions, hence a
contradiction.











which are incompatible expressions, hence a
contradiction with an equilibrium conﬁguration characterized by.nα ∈ {1,...,n − 1}.
And ﬁnally, for case (iii), we get that the conditions such that neither β −players nor
α − players want to deviate:
nα ≥ N( 2b−c
2[(d+b)−c])+ 2d−c
2[(d+b)−c]
nα ≤ N( 2b−c
2[(d+b)−c]) − 2b−c
2[(d+b)−c]
are also incompatible. A contradiction with an equi-
librium where nα ∈ {1,...,n − 1}. This completes the proof.
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